Mackay’s book covers witch hunts, alchemists, crusades and prophecies, but it is read for three chapters on money. Here they are in brief, with what historians now say about each.
Tulips, 1634–1637
The Dutch Republic was Europe’s most advanced economy, with the East India Company, the Amsterdam exchange and early futures markets. “Broken” tulips, streaked and flamed by a virus no one then understood, became the fashion among rich collectors. In the winter of 1636–37 trade in contracts on bulbs still in the ground took off in the taverns of several towns, and in the first days of February 1637 the buyers vanished. Mackay says the whole population joined in and the country’s commerce took years to recover. The historian Anne Goldgar, working in Dutch archives, found fewer than half a dozen prominent participants in trouble afterwards. The sailor who ate a precious bulb thinking it was an onion is a story, not a record.
The Mississippi Scheme, 1716–1720
John Law, a Scottish gambler and monetary theorist, persuaded the regent of France that paper money and credit could rescue a state ruined by Louis XIV’s wars. His bank worked; his Mississippi Company absorbed colonial trade, tax collection and the national debt. Its shares rose from about 500 livres to over 10,000 in January 1720, and in May the system broke. France took generations to trust paper money and a central bank again.
The South Sea Bubble, 1720
London copied Paris a few months behind. The South Sea Company, which barely traded, offered to take over Britain’s national debt in exchange for shares, bribed much of the government to win the deal, and saw its price go from about 130 to nearly 1,000 within months. Dozens of smaller bubble companies sprang up. In June Parliament passed the Bubble Act; in the autumn everything collapsed. Robert Walpole steered the rescue and came out the most powerful man in England.
The pattern
Mackay’s explanation is moral: greed, imitation, credulity. He ignores interest rates and contracts and looks at dukes queueing in the street. That is his weakness as a historian and his strength as a writer. Our edition’s essays apply the pattern to bitcoin, AI, housing, NFTs and finfluencers, and ask when a bubble is a fraud.
Sources
- Charles Mackay, Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, 2nd edition (London: Office of the National Illustrated Library, 1852).
- Anne Goldgar, Tulipmania: Money, Honor, and Knowledge in the Dutch Golden Age (University of Chicago Press, 2007).
- Thinking School edition: The Madness of Crowds, Mackay’s three chapters on financial manias with essays by Julian Delphiki (prologue, background, notes and counterpoints).